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Oro[, the High Priest thoughtj was a powerful god. He had accomplished
what no other god before him had attained: the consolidation of all the
islands... a master god like Oro merited supreme sacrifices like sharks and
men .... King Tamatoa's thoughts were different... he felt... considerable
uneasiness over the fact that the total of sacrifices for any given convocation
had now been established as nine [men], plus more perhaps according to the
chances of the day. The king wondered: "Is this sudden conversion to Oro a
device by the wise men of Haviki whereby they can depopulate my island and
thus accomplish by guile what they have always been unable to do by
battle?".. . Then, for the first time he expressed in words his real perplexity:
"It is very difficult to be king when the gods are changing. 1
* Assistant Professor, University of Michigan Business School. Ph.D., J.D.,
Northwestern University; M.A., B.A., University of Notre Dame.
** Ph.D., A.B.D. (Archeology), University Of Michigan; B.A., Bates College.
1. JAMEs A. MICHENER, HAwAi 34-35 (1959) (describing the "takeover" of a South
Pacific island named Havild, which led to the emigration from it and the travel to and
settling of Hawaii).
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Introduction
What is there that is new to say about bribery? Bribery is universally con-
demned, albeit not universally prohibited. Philip Nichols points out that
all the major world religions condemn the practice of bribery2 and that
every nation of the world outlaws it. 3 Transnational organizations from the
Organization of American States (OAS) 4 to the Organization for Economic
Development (OECD), 5 to name just two, condemn the practice and
attempt to prohibit it. Non-governmental organizations, such as Trans-
parency International, 6 publicize the countries where corruption is the
worst, a worthwhile task that focuses even more attention on the problem.
Scholars direct significant attention to the merits of various organizational
and legal regimes to eliminate the practice. 7
If we assume that bribery constitutes corruption and if various organi-
zations condemn the practice, what then is left to say? In this article, we
advance three ideas. First, it is important to understand exactly what is
wrong with bribery. Part I argues that the various contentions against brib-
ery from deontological, consequential, and even contractarian normative
premises present necessary but insufficient descriptions of the moral
problems of bribery. Instead, we wish to consider seriously the strengths
and weaknesses of what it means to live in a "global village." 8 Living in
such a community, as in any community, requires us to see bribery not as
an isolated transgression, but rather as indicative of a fragmented social
structure.
This is important because efficiency-based arguments against bribery
unfortunately carry with them a new way of (dis)orienting the world.
These changes are amplified, and are likely to be continually amplified, in
a world characterized by increasing e-commerce. E-commerce, a primarily
American and Western European business development, brings with it
2. See Philip M. Nichols, Regulating Transnational Bribery in Times of Globalization
and Fragmentation, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 257, 278 (1999).
3. See id. at 258.
4. See Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M.
724.
5. See Steven R. Salbu, Extraterritorial Restriction of Bribery: A Premature Evocation
of the Normative Global Village, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 223, 225 (1999).
6. See David A. Gantz, Globalizing Sanctions Against Foreign Bribery: The Emergence
of a New International Legal Consensus, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 457, 476 (1998).
7. See, e.g., Beverly Earle, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments: The Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act's Focus on Improving Investment Opportunities, 37 CLEV. ST.
L. RFv. 549 (1989); Beverly Earle, The United States' Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the
OECD Anti-Bribery Recommendation: When Moral Suasion Won't Work, Try the Money
Argument, 14 DicK. J. Ir'i. L. 207 (1996); David A Gantz, The Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act: Professional and Ethical Challenges for Lawyers, 14 Aruz. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 97
(1997); Philip M. Nichols, Corruption in the World Trade Organization: Discerning the
Limits of the World Trade Organization's Authority, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 711 (1996); Philip
M. Nichols, Outlawing Transnational Bribery Through the World Trade Organization, 28
LAw & PoL. INT'L Bus. 305 (1997); Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A
Critical Analysis of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 229 (1997).
8. While this term causes us discomfort, it seems to be the best available metaphor
to describe an interconnected political economy.
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notions of autonomy that, in some ways, make bribery harder to control.
As the opening vignette suggests, in such a changing environment, the
rules (or the gods in ancient Hawaii) change and leave one wondering
about what laws control. Quite obviously, the e-commerce age has brought
with it a global effort to view bribery as a significant impediment to com-
mercial development. Ultimately, we must ask how in this environment do
we battle bribery in various parts of the world without roiling sovereign
waters.
Second, we consider three anthropological cases of gift-giving. The
purpose of these cases is not to argue that cultures have different under-
standings of what constitutes a gift as opposed to a corrupting bribe. That
they do have different understandings has been well-established.9 Rather,
these cases illustrate those social institutions that can protect a gift from
becoming corrupting. These anthropological reports show that the public,
ritualistic, and relational aspects of the gift protect society from unscrupu-
lous bribers and bribe-takers. Certainly one cannot immediately trans-
plant the Kula found by Bronislaw Malinowski in the Trobriand Islands10
to contemporary business, however, one can learn from the institutional
functions served by Trobriand practices and apply them to our contempo-
rary situations. Part II addresses these issues.
The third and final aspect is perhaps the most important, but requires
far more development than we can provide here. We simply want to pro-
voke some thought on the relationship of corruption to the maintenance of
peace. An important reason given for the prohibition of bribery is that it
detracts from free trade, and free trade in turn fosters peace. While we
ultimately endorse this position, it is not as neat a connection as one might
think. Historically, trade also has provoked violence, particularly when a
gift is rejected or is deemed inappropriate. 1 Nonetheless, the connection
between the elimination of corruption and international peace is impor-
tant and, precisely because of this importance, one needs to understand
the structures that might allow for a more acceptable and effective transna-
tional prohibition of bribery.
In short, understanding the communal human nature is a step toward
effective elimination of corruption, although it is not necessarily consid-
ered in a market economic analysis. For our present purposes, we focus on
the notion of corruption from the perspective of the pre-market mind, as
analysis of economic questions in the contemporary age too easily assumes
a market orientation that misses important elements of a corrupting trans-
action. By recapturing a sense of a communal human nature, we take
advantage of opportunities for a richer understanding of how to combat
bribery in a way that also fosters harmony.
9. See Salbu, supra note 5, at 235.
10. See generally BRoNISLAWV MALINOWKSI, ARGONAUTS O1 THE WESTERN PACIFC: AN
AccouNT OF NATIVE ENTERPRISE AND ADVENTURE IN THE ARCHIPELAGOES Of MELANESLN
Nav GuINEA 326 (1922).
11. See discussion infra Part II.B.4.
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I. What is So Bad About Bribery?
We consider two types of bribery. The first relates to bribery of a govern-
mental official. The second relates to the bribery of a person in a business
who, for various reasons, may have a moral duty to act on behalf of another
person or an organization. In most respects, the moral analysis of bribery
remains the same for both. As David Gantz summarizes, the Federal Cor-
rupt Practices Act (FCPA) provides four elements in its attempt to charac-
terize governmental bribery and eliminate it. They are to:
(1) pay or offer to pay money or anything of value "corruptly," directly or
indirectly, to
(2) a foreign government official, political party, party official, political can-
didate or intermediary for such person,
(3) while knowing or having reason to know-including a "high probability
of knowledge"-that the purpose of the payment was to influence an official
act or official decision,
(4) designed to assist in obtaining or retaining business. 12
The two affirmative defenses to the Act are the legality of the payment
under the law of the host country and payment for travel and lodging aris-
ing out of promotional activities aimed at obtaining or retaining new busi-
ness.13 Failure of a host country to enforce local law is not a defense.14
Philip Nichols emphasizes this focus on governmental corruption by defin-
ing bribery as a "transaction in which an official misuses his or her office
'as a result of considerations of personal gain, which need not be
monetary."' 15
In an e-commerce age, of course, we must also consider other institu-
tions, such as commercial organizations. 16 Commonly, scholars maintain
that the nation-state system dates back to 1648 and the Treaty of Westpha-
lia.17 However, the rise of transnational organizations makes such a realist
approach "inadequate."1 8 In other words, one cannot simply focus on
nation-states when considering bribery. One cannot ignore "private" brib-
12. Gantz, supra note 6, at 460.
13. See id. at 460-61.
14. See id.
15. Nichols, supra note 2, at 258 (citing David H. Bagley, The Effects of Corruption in
a Developing Nation, 19 WORLD POL. Q. 719, 720 (1966)).
16. Professors Salbu and Nichols, in their excellent (and entertaining) dialogues on
bribery both acknowledge that non-governmental organizations are important new
actors on the economic scene, although both stress the merits of various anti-bribery
regimes in terms of nation-states. Salbu, for instance, says that "Itloday's world remains
one of separate sovereignties. Although states may one day prove obsolete, they are
today's primary global unites of analysis." Salbu, supra note 5, at 231.
17. See, e.g., HENRY KISSINGER, DIPLOMAcY 21 (1994).
18. Nichols helpfully describes these two schools. Realism posits that states are the
only meaningful actors in international relations, that states are rational actors seeking
power, and that the basic organizing principle of the relations between states is anarchy.
In a time when entrepreneurs are forging deep commercial alliances with little regard for
national borders, realism stops at the border. In a time of sustained global cooperation,
classical realism insists on a "world of states obsessed with their power vis-A-vis other
states." Nichols, supra note 2, at 456 (footnotes omitted); see also Kenneth W. Abbott,
Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YA.E J.
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ery because contemporary economics requires free flow of goods and ser-
vices on the basis of price and quality absent other considerations, such as
those of obtaining a bribe-payment. 19 In a free market, governmental regu-
lation ideally is minimal 20 so that the relative importance of other institu-
tions becomes more pronounced. Those institutions, such as corporations,
thus might also be subject to bribery concerns with similar effects on the
efficient distribution of goods and services.
Two corollaries flow from this multi-institutional view of the world.
First, corporations themselves might act to eradicate bribery. To that end,
we endorse "The C2 Principles" proposed by David Hess and Thomas Dun-
fee.21 An important reason for corporate initiatives is that corporations, if
properly structured, can bring the governed a sense of participation in the
creation of the norms prohibiting bribery.22 We will elaborate on this idea
in Part II.B.5 in proposing an amendment to Hess and Dunfee's important
contribution.
The second corollary to the multi-institutional view of the world is that
one also must consider non-governmental types of bribery. Accordingly,
one can follow a wider notion of bribery as presented by Dunfee, Smith
and Ross. 23 For them "[b]ribery occurs when one person (the briber) pro-
vides an inducement to another person (the bribee) that is intended to be
in exchange for the bribee doing, or not doing, something that would favor
the briber and be contrary to the bribee's positional duty."24 This defini-
tion, of course, includes not only governmental bribe-taking, but also a
great deal of activity within the private sector. An employee, for instance,
has the positional duty to benefit his principal-his boss or perhaps the
corporation-rather than himself. Thus, Dunfee, Smith and Ross apply
bribery to a larger set of institutional actors.
A. Moral Arguments Against Bribery
Using this broader definition, Dunfee, Smith and Ross consider three
moral arguments against bribery. The first is a deontological one: bribery
is wrong because it is an "intentional violation of a binding moral duty."25
An agent of a corporation represents the interests of the corporation rather
than her own self-interest and therefore violates this duty if she makes a
decision on behalf of the corporation for reasons that benefit herself (by
INT'L L. 335, 337-38 (1989). For a good overview of various perspectives on peace, see
APPROACHES TO PEACE: A READER IN PEACE STUDIES (David P. Barash ed., 2000).
19. See Gantz, supra note 6, at 464; Nichols, supra note 2, at 275.
20. See F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT 32 (1988).
21. See David Hess & Thomas W. Dunfee, Fighting Corruption: A Principled
Approach The C2 Principles (Combating Corruption), 33 CoRNELLJ. INT'L L. 593 (2000).
22. See generally Timothy L. Fort & Cindy A. Schipani, Corporate Governance in a
Global Environment: The Search for the Best of All Worlds, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 829(2000).
23. See Thomas W. Dunfee et al., Social Contracts and Marketing Ethics, 63J. MARKET-
ING 14 (1999).
24. Id. at 22.
25. Id.
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taking a bribe).26
The second argument is consequentialistic. Here, the prohibition
derives from the fact that bribery can harm the organization on whose
behalf the bribee acts by leading to a sub-optimal purchase, hiding the act
from shareholders, being inefficient, as well as creating larger social harms
in terms of corrosive effects on the social structure, diminished happiness
of citizens, reduced credibility of government, increased lawlessness, and
even possible revolution. 27 Thus, under consequentialism, one condemns
bribery not necessarily because of the violation of a prescribed duty, but
because of the harms resulting from bribery.
Although deontological and consequentialist arguments are common
in contemporary moral parlance, Dunfee, Smith and Ross note significant
problems with these prohibitions on bribery. For instance, under deonto-
logical analysis, other duties may force one to engage in bribery. These
could include feeding one's family, employing workers, or pursuing a
worthwhile goal, such as inducing a South African business to oppose
apartheid during the 1980s. Moreover, the deontological approach comes
largely from an application of Immanuel Kant's theory of ethics to the mod-
ern business world.28 Ignoring philosophical attacks against Kant in busi-
ness ethics, anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski writes that:
The great moral philosopher was wrong when he formulated his categorical
imperative, which was to serve human beings as a fundamental guiding prin-
ciple of behavior. In advising us to act so that our behaviour might be taken
as a norm of universal law, he reversed the natural state of things. The real
rule guiding human behavior is this: "what everyone else does, what appears
as norm of general conduct, this is right, moral and proper. 29
Malinowski bases his assessment not on normative philosophy, but on
how people actually formulate their moral views. What others do in the
community is also likely to be what an individual in that community does.
A Kantian assessment, therefore, may be of limited assistance.30 Regarding
consequentialism, the task of actually being able to foresee and calculate
possible deleterious effects of a given action is problematic for human
capabilities. A person given the opportunity to receive a bribe is not likely,
even if she is willing to undertake the effort, to be able to compute the
various effects of her decision on the variety of stakeholders who may be
affected by it. This is particularly true if she must consider the numerous
stakeholders in a large corporation or a nation-state.
Regardless of the particular theory, Dunfee, Smith and Ross note that
26. See id. at 23.
27. See id. at 23 (citing Nichols).
28. See, e.g., ROBERT SOLOMON, ETHICS AND EXCELLENCE 113-14 (1992) (arguing that
Kantianism acts as a sort of disease in modern ethical theory); WILLIAM C. FREDERICK,
VALUES, NATURE AND CuLTuRE IN THE AMERICAN CORPORATION 252 (1995) (arguing that
Kantian business ethics are anachronistic).
29. See MALINOWKSI, supra note 10, at 326.
30. See SOLOMON, supra note 28, at 114; FREDERIcK, supra note 28, at 252-54.
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those bribe-givers who provide "such largess" occupy a difficult position.31
They must either claim that the gifts make no difference, avoiding charac-
terization as a bribe or as illegitimately spending shareholders' money; or
that they do make a difference, accepting the characterization of the expen-
diture as a bribe but justifying it in terms of profitability. 32
To provide guidance on bribery which is sensitive to varying commu-
nity norms and yet subjects these norms to certain moral transcultural
minimums, Tom Donaldson and Tom Dunfee develop a series of
hypernorms against bribery.33 "Necessary social efficiency" is one such
hypernorm. 34 It is an action or policy that "contributes toward the provi-
sion of necessary social goods sufficient to sustain the least well-off mem-
bers of society at a level of reasonable possibility concerning liberty,
health, food, housing, education, and just treatment."35 Donaldson and
Dunfee establish this hypernorm by arguing that two necessary goods are
fairness and aggregate welfare. 36 In order to actualize these goods, one
must have institutions such as private property.37 Following Aristotle's
argument against Plato, they argue that one is more likely to utilize private
property efficiently and productively, for the benefit of all members of the
society, than would be the case in absence of private ownership. 38 There-
fore, the organization of the economic structure of a society must reflect
efficient utilization of resources in which society has a stake and individu-
als should discharge their role duties stemming from the economizing
parameters of efficiency strategies in which one participates. 39 In other
words, the least well-off have the best chance of obtaining basic goods if
resources are used efficiently. Consequently, society should be structured
to allocate resources efficiently and individuals should fulfill their roles in
this structure.40
For Donaldson and Dunfee, bribery violates the hypernorm of neces-
sary social efficiency in two ways. First, it harms political participation. 4
1
31. See Dunfee et al., supra note 23, at 26.
32. See id.
33. See THOMAS DONALDSON & THoMAs W. DUNFEE, TIEs THAT BiND: A SOcIAL CoN-
TRACTS APPROACH To BusiN.ss ETnics (1999). For Donaldson and Dunfee, moral analysis
in business occurs on two levels. The first level is that of the local community. A norm
is "authentic" if members of the community have an opportunity to consent to the norm
of the community, consent they can evidence through actual assent, the ability to partici-
pate in the development of the communal norm, or an opportunity to leave the commu-
nity if in disagreement with the norm. See id. at 38. However, since a community may
enact a norm that may strike many as deeply problematic, they also propose a second-
tier assessment based on formal moral theory. See id. at 49-81. In this tier, Donaldson
and Dunfee propose the notion of "hypernorms," which are transcultural moral mini-
mums that any local norm must accord with in order for the local norm to be "legiti-
mate" and binding. See id.
34. See id. at 117.
35. Id. at 119.
36. See id. at 121.
37. See id. at 129.
38. See id. at 129.
39. See id. at 129-30.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 226-30.
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When a government official makes a decision on the basis of a bribe, he
allocates public resources in a manner not subject to the political control of
the public because the decision is not open to accountability mecha-
nisms.42 As a hidden transaction, the bribe diverts money from the politi-
cal process.43 Accordingly, there is a violation of the societal norm
designed to provide the least well-off the possibility of pursuing basic
goods.44
Bribery also violates the hypernorm of necessary social efficiency in
that it skews the efficient distribution of resources.45 Under Donaldson
and Dunfee's analysis, the skewing of resources resulting from bribery may
very well hurt the least well-off.4 6 Although a particular bribe may be rela-
tively small relative to a country's gross domestic product, the diversion of
funds that occurs possibly could produce a profoundly negative cumula-
tive effect on the economy.4 7 Moreover, some bribes are not so small.
Large bribes obviously have a greater impact on the efficient allocation of
resources. Therefore, this argument, which is both economic and moral in
nature, is helpful in the analysis of bribery. Furthermore, we advocate con-
sidering the sufficiency of efficiency as a moral criterion in an e-commerce
age.
4 8
As Judge John Noonan notes, "bribery as a phenomenon is as old as
bureaucratic systems." 49 Indeed, in both governmental and private brib-
ery, agency is a central problem. It surfaces whenever an agent, who is
under an obligation to utilize another person's funds for that person's ben-
efit, instead directs the funds for his, the agent's, own benefit. The larger
the structure and the greater the agent's separation from the ownership of
the assets, the greater the risk of bribery. The difficulty with the predomi-
nant theories of moral behavior-Kantian, Utilitarian, or Economic-is that
they do not indicate why an individual would find her self-interest directly
enhanced by foregoing bribery as long as she eluded capture.
There is a another corporate analogue to this in terms of corporate
governance. For most of the twentieth century, American corporate gov-
ernance scholarship focused on how to control managers who were no
longer the primary shareholders. 50 Simply put, in large corporate institu-
tions, the degree of separation of one's duty from the ownership of assets
one controls fuels the temptation to influence the flow of these assets
toward one's personal preferences to the detriment of the principal. Brib-
42. See id. at 226-27.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 228.
46. See id. at 225.
47. See id. at 228-29.
48. See infra note 193 and accompanying text.
49. Nichols, supra note 2, at 272.
50. See, e.g., A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REv.
1049 (1931); A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees, 45 HARv. L.
REv. 1365, 1366-67 (1932); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers
Trustees, 45 HARv. L. REv. 1145 (1932).
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ery provides one example of this phenomenon; managers who direct corpo-
rate funds toward their preferred charitable objectives provides another.
Perhaps Milton Friedman presents the rhetorical culmination criticizing
this problem when he insists that the clear duty of a manager is to enhance
profitability.5 1 Regardless of how one assesses Friedman's argument of
corporate social responsibility, he makes a valid assessment that managers
who direct funds to programs that have no relation to the profitability of
their corporation, under current governance regimes, are stealing from
their company regardless of their noble intentions.5 2 This appraisal is true
insofar as current corporate governance insists that the purpose of a corpo-
ration is to maximize profits for shareholders through the efficient use of
resources.
It is important to see the agency dimensions of this issue because effi-
ciency serves as a helpful criterion for the evaluation of agents' actions.
Nonetheless, we are leery of relying too heavily on efficiency as a criterion
by which one can adequately assess issues such as bribery and corporate
governance. Focusing solely on efficiency may obscure other relevant fac-
tors that are not so easily monetized and which, if monetized, grossly dis-
tort the value itself.5 3 Thus, we explore two aspects of efficiency in
formulating anti-bribery policies in an e-commerce age. We offer a cri-
tique of efficiency, not in opposition to Donaldson and Dunfee's
hypernorm of necessary social efficiency,5 4 but as a supplement to it and
clarification of the difficulties that attend its use.
First, what happens when one looks at bribery not as a moral problem
to be rectified by transnational legal agreements encouraging governments
and corporations to crack down on bribery, but instead as a symptom of a
community whose gods, as the opening vignette suggests, have changed
and, therefore, whose moral feedback mechanisms have short-circuited?
Second, although efficiency may be a sound principle for twentieth century
business practices, is it as important for the twenty-first century?
B. A Cybernetic Argument
Because our approach differs significantly from the dominant traditional
Enlightenment ethics theories ,55 we describe the basis of our recommen-
dations in some detail. We believe that an agent's interest in paying or
taking a bribe is greater when notions of autonomy dominate, threatening
to marginalize the communal notion of self. This occurs when an individ-
ual, shorn of communal obligations, sees his self-interest as abstracted
51. See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits,
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 32, 126.
52. See id. at 24.
53. See Roy A. RAPPAPORT, ECOLOGY, MEANING, & RELIGION 131 (1979).
54. See supra note 33.
55. See, e.g., PATRARA WERHANE, PERSONS, RIGHTS AND CORPORATIONS (1985) (relying
on Kantian premises); WILLIAM M. EvANT & R_ EDWARD FREEMAN, A Stakeholder Theory of
the Modern Corporation, in ETHICAL THEORY AND BusINEss 97, 101-05 (Tom L. Beauchamp
& Norman E. Boure eds., 3d ed. 1988) (same); DONALDSON & DUNFEE, supra note 33
(relying on contractarian notions).
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from nonmaterial goods. Bribery then becomes rational unless one is
caught. Alternatively, the observance of ethical business practices likely
nourishes an individual's attachment to the community and enhances the
common good, which then benefits the agent's self. This cycle is harmed
by corruption.
1. The Corporate Analogy
Robert Jackall has written extensively on the phenomenon of how bureau-
cracy separates individuals from the consequences of their actions.5 6 This
is particularly true, he argues, in large modern corporations.5 7 Others,
such as Peter Berger and Richard John Neuhaus,58 as well as Robert Nis-
bet,5 9 have argued that because moral character forms in small "mediating
institutions," large bureaucratic regimes can leave an individual discon-
nected from the consequences of his actions.60 Mediating institutions pro-
vide an internal feedback mechanism to regulate behavior; one that large
bureaucratic systems have difficulties replicating. This mechanism iS a
cybernetic structure, defined by anthropologist Roy Rappaport as one
denoting:
a structure or form of a particular sort, that of the closed causal loop. Intrin-
sic to, or entailed by, the operation of a simple cybernetic structure is "nega-
tive feedback," such that deviations of the states of components of the loop
from reference values initiate processes tending to return those states to
their reference values.61
In other words, we can approach the bribery question by asking what types
of structures we can create to connect an agent with her work sufficiently
well so that organizational mechanisms provide the requisite forces to dis-
cipline wrongdoing and return the organization to one that is not corrupt.
In rephrasing the question, we do not reject the work of transnational
organizations, such as Transparency International, in their attempts to
eradicate bribery and corruption. Further, we do not object to Donaldson
and Dunfee's analysis. In fact, we endorse transnational organizations'
efforts to punish bribe-taking for the moral reasons presented by Donald-
son and Dunfee. What we offer is a refinement: a recommendation that to
combat bribery effectively, one must create self-regulating structures.
Doing so requires considerations beyond efficiency. These considerations
relate to basic human nature. We must reflect on how individuals' moral
behavior inculcates and relates to the good of a community whose mem-
bers are harmed by corruption. Moreover, anthropological evidence sug-
56. See ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS (1988).
57. See id. at 11-12.
58. See PETER BERGER & RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, To EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE ROLE OF
MEDIATING STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC POLICY (1977).
59. See ROBERT A. NISBET, THE QUEST FOR COMMUNITY: A STUDY IN THE ETHICS o
ORDER AND FREEDOM (1953).
60. See generally TIMOTHY FORT, ETICS AND GOvERNANCE: BUSINESS AS MEDIATING
INsTITUTION (forthcoming 2001, Oxford University Press).
61. RAPPAPORT, supra note 53, at 76.
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gests that these structures, rather than the free market itself, nourish
peaceful relations among countries and thus supports our argument.
As an example of our position, consider the recent debate regarding
bribery between Steven Salbu and Philip Nichols. The problem of combat-
ing bribery while not antagonizing countries with non-western values is at
the heart of the debate between Salbu and Nichols.62 Salbu repeatedly cau-
tions against imposing values from afar and attempting to make distinc-
tions regarding the nature of appropriate gift-giving in various cultures. 63
His argument can be seen as one stemming from the difficulty associated
with the creation of a community-often referred to as a "global village"-
which is simply too large to offer the kind of virtue-inculcating lessons that
inspire a person not to accept or offer bribes. A premature attempt to do
so risks moral imperialism. 64
Nichols, on the other hand, notes that all cultures condemn the prac-
tice legally and religiously so that the risks of imperialism are virtually
nonexistent.65 With such cross-cultural agreement and provided that local
communities can determine whether a particular transaction is corrupting,
extra-territorial and transnational prohibition of the practice of bribery is a
logical and even helpful step in eradication of bribery, particularly in pov-
erty-stricken countries which are most harmed by bribery.66
Both Salbu's and Nichols' arguments are correct since a law prohibit-
ing bribery may be most meaningful only if the lawmaking institutions are
viewed as legitimate in the eyes of the governed. Obtaining that level of
legitimacy is not simply a matter of articulating a finely-wrought principle
or well-honed law, admirable and essential as those accomplishments may
be. Legal historian Larry Kramer, for instance, argues that the Anti-Feder-
alist argument at the time of the writing of the U.S. Constitution empha-
sized the need for small communities. 67 This was important, not to
promote homogenous groupings of individuals as some scholars argue,68
but to obtain the "confidence of the people." The governed demand the
ability to interact with the governors: to see them, hear them, and talk to
them. 69 With the ability to conduct a personal evaluation of those who
prescribe rules, one's confidence in the rules, whatever they may be,
increases. If there is indeed a relationship between the confidence of the
governed and the small sizes of institutions promulgating laws, then we
could view the activities of transnational organizations as imperialistic
even if the laws themselves are just, and even if a person might otherwise agree
with the content of the law.
62. See Salbu, supra note 5; Nichols, supra note 2.
63. See Salbu, supra note 5, at 225-26.
64. See id.
65. See Nichols, supra note 2.
66. See id.
67. See Larry Kramer, The Confidence of the People: Size, Representation, and the
Constitutional Role of Political Parties, Presentation at the Legal Theory Workshop of
the University of Michigan Law School (Nov. 5, 1999) (manuscript on file with author).
68. See id. at 4-30 (noting criticisms of Montesquieu).
69. See id. at 62.
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In terms of bribery, Salbu is right insofar as the imposition of laws by
an abstract organization can alienate even if the law itself is unobjection-
able.70 Nichols is correct in that people do agree that bribery is wrong.
7 1
The way to encourage individuals to see their self-interest connected to
eschewing bribery is not by a well-wrought edict from the World Trade
Organization or the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law. These transnational organizations should take an intervening step
and also attend to the encouragement and development of cybernetic struc-
tures within countries, which would better enable those countries to flush
out the corrupting practices occurring within their borders. In fact, argu-
ing in another forum and on a different topic, Salbu offers a model for this
very kind of self-regulating community:
The functional family provides a useful analogy here. Like the family
members who genuinely wish one another success, transactional allies will
naturally constrain self-interest through concessions made for the ultimate
good of others and of the alliance. Those who interact functionally and
familially have little use for formalization of obligation, and indeed such
formalization would be wasteful and ineffective. Like the organically moder-
ated relationships that comprise the cohesive family, close business network
allies have a reduced need for compulsory rules and obligations, both the
establishment and the implementation of which are costly and superfluous
in function. Innovations in relationship management forms may better
serve emerging, nonadversarial forms of cooperative linkages. 7 2
Salbu paints a picture of a need for legal doctrine to develop notions of
contracts that take into account the ethical and relational commitment to a
common good in a particular historical context. Rather than adversarial
attempts to control and predict the elaboration of a transactional exchange,
there is instead a need to provide models that accord with the realities of
global business practices.
In a popular vein, Tom's of Maine CEO Tom Chappell describes this
extension to corporate life when he compares the corporation to a family:
In the family we learn love, patience, respect, nurturing, affirmation, and
health. The family also teaches us about competition, domination, selfish-
ness, and deceit. The family is thus a relatively efficient learning system for
the development of mind, spirit, and body. It involves the whole self. Cer-
tainly it has its own hierarchy and power centers, but it also can be egalita-
rian. Members of a happy, thriving family will do anything for each other;
they devote themselves to maintaining that happiness and increasing it.
Substitute the word company for family.., and you get an idea of what I
envision a company community to include. In my experience, employees
will run through walls for a company that understands them, gives them
some freedom, encourages their creativity, appreciates their work, and
rewards it fairly. Treat an employee like a cog in a machine, and you'll get a
cog's work. Treat that same person as a member of your family, and you'll
70. See Salbu, supra note 5.
71. See Nichols, supra note 2.
72. Steven R. Salbu, The Decline of Contract as a Relationship Management Form, 47
RUTGERs L. REV. 1271, 1303-04 (1995) (citation omitted).
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get loyalty.73
In a scholarly vein, Robbin Derry uses a similar model when she
applies feminist scholar Virginia Held's "mother-child" paradigm to busi-
ness ethics.7 4 Derry's argument has two central points. First, Derry
argues that it is a mistake to compartmentalize personal and professional
life; the experiences of the one pour over into the experiences of the
other.7 5 She argues that personal experiences and models of parenting
relationships may have something important to say about how to blend
economizing and "ecologizing" values in business.76 Second, she notes
that rather than individuals finding themselves in the position of autono-
mous or rational actors, a parent finds him- or herself in an obligatory
bond of responsibility, a characteristic of enmeshment that we rarely
acknowledge in business.7 7 We suggest, however, that this enmeshment is
ever-present in a mediating institution.
Functional families exhibit a relationship between the well-being of the
family unit that is the common good and the individuals comprising it. 7 8
The bonds within this unit extend beyond mere economic sustenance to
entail moral, emotional, and spiritual values. Similarly, we suggest that
even if we design businesses to focus on economic efficiency, the relation-
ships within the company will be human ones and the bonds that sustain
these relationships will also entail moral, emotional, and spiritual values.
We may encourage such values by employing particular types of structures,
but we cannot reduce them to philosophical principles or legal rules.
It may be helpful to note briefly an argument made by legal scholar
and business ethicist Jeffrey Nesteruk. Nesteruk claims that business eth-
ics suffer because they offer an impoverished view of the law as a set of
rules, obligations, and constraints. 79 Beyond specific rules, Nesteruk
emphasizes the rhetorical power of the images created by the law.8 0 The
use of law as a language provides us a mechanism to constitute and
develop character, culture, and community.8 1 In other words, phrases such
as "fiduciary duty" or even "economic efficiency" become much more than
rules; in fact, they form the ways in which we form our lives and communi-
ties. Relating this to bribery suggests that between relativism and global-
ism lies a role for transnational legal institutions to propose laws that turn
organizations into cybernetic structures, where moral behavior is valued
because one sees the connection between self-interest and the common
73. Tom CHAPPELL, THE SOUL OF A BusINEss: MANAGING FOR PROFIT AND THE COMMON
GOOD 61-62 (1993).
74. See generally Robbin Derry, The Mother-Child Paradigm and Its Relevance to the
Workplace, 38 Bus. & Soc. 217 (1999).
75. See id. at 218.
76. See id. at 222 (commenting of William Frederick's allusion to Virginia Held.
Derry elaborates on the Held position in integrating with Frederick's work).
77. See id. at 223.
78. See Salbu, supra note 72.
79. See Jeffrey Nesteruk, Reimagining the Law, 9 Bus. ETHics Q. 603, 606-07 (1999).
80. See id. at 604.
81. See id. at 611-15.
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good of the community to which one belongs. As we note later, this step in
what is essentially an issue of corporate governance is the final, and criti-
cal, amendment to the C2 Principles. The heart of this connection is the
creation of structures which link community interest to individual self-
interest.
The disjunction between an individual's self-interest and the common
good of the community to which that individual belongs is at the heart of
Alasdair MacIntyre's analysis. 82 Maclntyre critiques the bureaucratic man-
agerial system's concealment of moral values in favor of autonomous, inde-
pendent choices shorn of historical and cultural context.83 Without such a
connection, a prohibition can appear arbitrary, imposed, and meaning-
less.84 MacIntyre, in two separate books, draws upon Hawaiian history to
demonstrate his point.
2. A Detour Through Hawaii
While a discussion of ancient Hawaiian history may seem out of place in
the context of a discussion on bribery, we wish to emphasize the utility of
this history: if a rule is enacted with no more understanding of its rationale
than that an authority has decreed it, the law will be less efficacious than if
those subject to the law have a sense and at least an understanding, if not
ownership, of it. In order to demonstrate this point, we shall look at the
notion of taboo in Hawaiian history and focus on the intelligibility of any
taboo, including one prohibiting bribery.
MacIntyre reports that when Captain James Cook made his third voy-
age to the Polynesian islands in 1778, his crew was surprised that while
sexual mores were very lax, there were strict prohibitions on women eating
with men.85 When asked why, the Polynesian Islanders simply told the
sailors that the practice was taboo.86 No one, though, could really under-
stand what taboo meant. In fact, anthropologists concluded that a few
decades later, the natives themselves did not really understand what taboo
meant.87 According to MacIntyre, this is why Kamehameha II easily over-
threw the taboo system in 1819.88 While MacIntyre overdraws his assess-
ment of Kamehameha 11,89 Maclntyre correctly observes that if a cultural
82. See generally ALASDAIR MAcINTY=, AFTER VIRTUE (1981).
83. See id. at 18.
84. See id.
85. See id. at 105.
86. See id. at 105.
87. See MARSHALL SAHLINS, IsLANDs OF HISTORY 142 (1985).
88. See MAcII-YRB, supra note 82, at 105.
89. For a history, see LILIKALA KAME'ELEIHIWA, NATnvE LAND AND FOREIGN DEsIREs
(1992). Pre-westernized Hawaii featured a highly stratified, hierarchical social system
with gods and kings somewhat interchangeable, and with regular ritual sacrifices of
human beings as well as infanticide. It was also a society that knew few western restric-
tions of sexual practices: having multiple partners, married or not, was the norm, and
they even viewed incest not only as permissible among the Ai'i Nui (the nobles) but
necessary to produce a Moi'i (the king). Internally, however, a series of checks and
powers highly regulated this social system in addition to a sense of impartiality, prop-
erty rights, communication, and subsidiarity, which maintained pono, a sense of bal-
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rule of behavior is predicated simply on a prohibition without any other
understanding of its rationale, then that rule is hardly persuasive.90
In actuality, the notion of a taboo prohibiting women and men from
eating together was based on the creation myth of Hawaiians called the
Kumulipo, a myth taken with great seriousness in prewesternized Hawaii.91
So too, for that matter, was a freewheeling attitude toward sex with multi-
ple partners and spouses throughout life a logical participation in the
highly sexually charged creation myth of Kumulipo.92 The taboos were
checks that kept powerful forces of the universe in balance. Without this
creation myth, the religious system collapsed and so did the taboos.
Abstracted from that myth, witnessed by the lack of harsh consequences
for breaking the taboo in conjunction with Cook's arrival, applied in a way
that systematically and by definition "discriminated" against commoners,
and further undermined when the ruling class, the Ali'i Nui (the nobles)
and the Moi'i (the king) used taboo for commercial profitability with the
west (i.e. a form of bribery). As such, the practice of taboo became an
ineffective moral fragment that was only barely understood by the native
Hawaiians.93 What once was a behavioral system connecting individuals
with cosmic identity was undermined when the rules of behavior no longer
made any sense to the governed.
Thus, we can say that the Ali'i Nui's fondness for western luxury
prompted them to misuse taboo for commercial advantage. They accepted
bribes, thereby further disconnecting their own good from the common
good of the maka'aina and making taboo itself unintelligible by precluding
the communication of its rationale in a way that would gain cultural
assent. Between 1795 and 1819, Kamehameha also used taboo rules to
regulate trade with European countries thus changing taboo rules from rit-
ance or equilibrium. These checks came in the form of religion, competition, and the
aloha 'aina, the love of and care for the land. Changes in all three resulted in the loss of
traditional Hawaiian culture. After Kamehameha's death in 1819, his son Kamehameha
II (or Liholiho) became king. But Liholiho did not have his father's strength or aura.
With no mahele remaining to establish his authority, he turned to a religious test of
strength, which he failed. At that point, his power was very weak. Two of
Kamehameha's wives, the royal wife Keopuakini (Liholiho's mother) and Kamehameha's
favorite wife Ka'ahumanu (who acted as a regent) encouraged Liholiho to break kapu
and permit women to eat with men. Liholiho accomplished this by first allowing gender
intermixing among the Ali' Nui and then later through his own participation. This effec-
tively ended any pretense of Hawaiian religion. Rather than accepting MacIntyre's inter-
pretation that Liholiho undertook a Nietzschean overthrow of Hawaiian religious
system, viewing the breaking of a kapu as a quest to reverse the disastrous loss of Hawai-
ian population by embracing a new religious tradition that seemed to offer a new pono
and life would be more accurate. See id.
90. See MAcIN'YRE, supra note 82, at 106.
91. See VALERIO VALERI, KINGSHIP AND SACRIFICE: RITuAL AND SOCIETY IN ANCIENT
HAwAII 4-7 (Paula Wissing trans., University of Chicago Press 1985); see also J.D.
BISIGNANI, KAuAi HANDBOOK 19-39 (3d ed. 1997) (providing a surprisingly accurate and
concise summary of Hawaiian history).
92. See SAHLINS, supra note 87, at 9-26.
93. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL ENQUIRY: ENCYCLOPAE-
DIA, GENEAOLOGY, AND TRADITION 184 (1990).
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ual practice to practical economization. 94 As Sahlins indicates, the taboo's
meaning changed from something ensuring the common good to a private
benefit through a process of "a logical extension [which reached] the point
of a functional transformation." 9 5 In short, it became a proprietary right
equivalent to, and used today as, "no trespassing."96 This meant that "for
the common people, the sacred restrictions which promised divine benefits
(when respected) were now directly counterpoised to the general wel-
fare."9 7 This further discredited kapu so that no intelligible rationale for it
existed other than to know that it was prohibited.
MacIntyre argues that we are in the same moral position today that the
Hawaiians were in then.98 In fact, he argues that one would see the
Enlightenment project-perhaps best exemplified in Kantian universal duty
and utilitarianism-as degenerative in the pre-Cook Hawaiian mind
because of how the "detachment of European moral rules from their place
within an overall theological moral scheme, embodying and representing a
highly specific conception of human nature, corresponds to the similar
detachment of taboo rules."99 With moral rules serving as abstract princi-
ples derived from an earlier history that we no longer know, moral rules
and duties are disembodied fragments with no real authority except that
which a powerful person can will and impose on others. 10 0
This applies to bribery insofar as capitalist notions of efficiency and
self-interest replace the pre-market understanding of selfhood and the rela-
tionship of that self to the community. More specifically, efficiency is a
helpful criterion for action when situated within a context where its execu-
tion leads to communal goals. In ancient Hawaii or a modern mediating
institution alike, efficiency is the mechanism that most adaptively distrib-
utes social goods however we define those goods. That definition may
exclude money and wealth. Abstracted from a communal understanding of
what is beneficial, efficiency can easily mean maximization of individual
self-interest. Such a view of efficiency makes bribery perfectly logical.
Only if one sufficiently raises the costs of bribery, such as through tougher
anti-bribery schemes, would an individual choose not to maximize self-
interest by bribing or accepting a bribe, whether in a governmental or cor-
porate capacity. It is important to see, however, that this is only one of
many possible schemes. There are other communal schemes in which the
"individual" self is a complex set of relationships. Such schemes provide a
different sense of gift-giving and perhaps might be revitalized in a "global
village." It is critical to recapture that communal self and to provide struc-
tures that nourish it because otherwise bribery is simply the logical out-
come of a fragmented society encountering the wealth and freedom of
94. See SAILINS, supra note 87, at 142.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See MAcIT-YRE, supra note 93, at 182-83 (1990).
99. MAcIN-mY, supra note 82, at 185.
100. See MAcINrmn, supra note 82, at 106.
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capitalism and, as such, any attempts to outlaw bribery through transna-
tional organizations would be seen as empty taboo rules; empty because
they make no meaningful connection between the people and the
prohibition.
II. Lessons from Anthropology
Because we rely on anthropological evidence to argue for the communal
aspect of human nature, we would like to consider gift-giving from the per-
spective of anthropological accounts of societies which have this pre-mar-
ket conception of human nature. In doing so, three lessons are
enlightening for a contemporary assessment of bribery. Our argument is
not that transnational organizations are a mistake or that they should not
attempt to reach a global understanding of norms promoting the global
common good. To the contrary, we believe that these efforts are important
and vital, but that their efficacy will depend upon the integration of global
norms into the sphere of personal meaningfulness more than upon the
logic of the law itself.
It is one thing to note that different cultures have differing practices
regarding what constitutes a gift vis-A-vis a bribe. It is another to attempt to
enter the minds of the members of a culture to understand why the analyti-
cal categories western capitalism applies to various types of exchanges dis-
tort the very communities to which anti-bribery legislation may apply.
Three thoroughly inter-related aspects of gift-giving are worth noting. They
are the difference in the understanding of self-interest, the inherently spiri-
tual nature often accompanying an exchange, and the resulting conclusion
that an exchange to obtain economic advantage is not necessarily a cor-
rupting bribe.
A. Fundamentally, Nothing is a Gift: The Role of Self-Interest
Contemporary business and legal analysis adopts the perspective of the
rational person who seeks to maximize her self-interest. Some influential
economists, such as Oliver Williamson, characterize human behavior as
opportunistic-"self-interest seeking with guile."''1 1 So ingrained is the
connection of self-interest and law, that some have argued that it is impos-
sible for corporate theorists even to consider a description of legal behavior
that is not connected with self-interested behavior. 10 2
Thought of in terms of economic self-interest, one runs into an agency
question as to how to constrain the self-interest of an individual who is
able to benefit the "self' at the expense of the company. Indeed, this is
what Dunfee, Smith and Ross consider when they caution that an individ-
ual as an agent could have a fiduciary duty to a principal, such as the
company, which would transform the taking of a bribe into a violation of
101. OLIVER E. WILLIAISON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLI-
CATIONS 9 (1975).
102. See ETIcs AND AGENCY THEORY: AN INITODUCTION (Norman E. Bowie & R.
Edward Freeman eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1992).
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that duty and therefore an immoral act.103 The economists' commitment
to self-interest begs an enormous question, however, of what constitutes
the "self." By monetizing the self so that it comprises that in which a
rational individual finds the most utility, one confines the notion of the
self to a particular view. From this vantage point, gifts must either be per-
sonal and outside economic calculations or part-and-parcel of business
activity itself.
There are other ways of conceiving of the concept of "self." For
instance, in speaking of self-interest, Marcel Mauss, who wrote the classic
anthropological text on gift-giving, argues that:
If some equivalent reason animates the Trobriand or American Indian chiefs,
the Andaman clans, etc., or once motivated generous Hindus, and Germanic
or Celtic nobles, as regards their gifts and expenditure, it is not the cold
reasoning of the merchant, the banker, and the capitalist. In those civiliza-
tions they are concerned with their own interest, but in a different way from
our own age. They hoard, but in order to spend, to place under an obliga-
tion, to have their own 'liege men'. On the other hand, they carry on
exchange, but it is above all in luxury articles, ornaments or clothes, or
things that are consumed immediately, as at feasts. They repay with inter-
est, but this is in order to humiliate the person initially making the gift or
exchange, and not only to recompense him for loss caused to him by
'deferred consumption'. There is self-interest, but this self-interest is only
analogous to what allegedly sways us.10 4
According to one of his most important interpreters, Mary Douglas,
the notion of self that Mauss observed is one in which "individuals" were
identified through their relationships with the social and spiritual
world. 10 5 In this social world, for instance, gifts were constantly
exchanged for all forms of goods and services. 10 6 While individuals in this
world were certainly self-interested, they were interested in a range of
things and relationships which was far more complex than can be captured
by any one criterion, such as in the case of the rational economic actor. A
rational economic actor may look at interest payments as the heart of a
transaction enabling a borrower to rent an asset to satisfy that borrower's
preferences and for a lender to put her assets to productive use generating
returns to satisfy her preferences. Does this assessment, however, contem-
plate the humiliation of receiving a loan? Does it account for how individu-
103. See, e.g., Dunfee, et al., supra note 23.
104. MARCEL MAuss, THE GiFT: THE FoRM AND REASON FOR EXCHANGE IN ARcHAIc SociE-
TIEs 75 (W.D. Halls trans., 1990). We combine some things that, in the original, were
not so obviously related. Although we think this presentation of potlatch and mana
does not distort Mauss's central point, we must note that these are terms with different
origins. They have become more general terms, however. Mana is a spiritual term for
fitness, ability to lead, and strength. It plays prominently in the accounts of Pacific
Island and Big Man societies. Potlatch is a term which originated with the coastal groups
of the Northwestern United States, and was a type of feast in which these Native Ameri-
cans ritually burned huge quantities of trade and other goods to "reset the clock," or
clear the slate, and perhaps to prevent the accumulation of wealth through the trade
process.
105. See id. at viii (Douglas's introduction).
106. See id.
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als internally "feel" about a stratification of social hierarchy comprising
luxury and "lendable" money versus the lack of those things?
Peter Richerson and Robert Boyd note that everything in human his-
tory suggests that we are not well-adapted to tolerate anything beyond the
slightest deviation from social equality. 107 Nonetheless, the bureaucratic
system of principal-agent relationship combined with the wealth disparities
produced by capitalism,108 trades on a dynamic that opposes this egalita-
rian predisposition. Thus, an agent (or a borrower), may experience
aspects of psychological humiliation, such as in discharging the duties that
accompany one's role, that tempt one to resist arguments about efficiency
and instead think in terms of taking advantage of one's position to enhance
one's status. This assessment is probably more telling with respect to low-
level agent misconduct than conduct by a government leader leading to
extortion. It is meant more as a provocation than a comprehensive analy-
sis. The provocation is whether a principal-agent or borrower-lender trans-
actional analysis takes into account the dimensions of human nature and
personal feeling so that it adequately captures the reality of the situation.
Mauss' assessment is that capitalist notions of self-interest do not capture
this reality.109 This does not mean that a capitalist notion of self-interest is
wrong, merely that it only partially describes the dimensions of some situ-
ations.110 We need more to understand what comprises self-interest.
In a pre-market world, one could not be part of a society without also
being part of a gift-exchange process. This process could certainly be one
that was neither purely personal nor commercial. It was, in fact, both. In
studying the Trobriand people, for instance, Bronislaw Malinowski
described the Kula gift cycle and concluded that the Kula is half-commer-
cial, half-ceremonial. 11 The people established no fixed line between
trade or barter and gift-giving. 112 Since it could be both, even today we
face ambiguities as to what constitutes a corrupting bribe. Seats in a
skybox? Dinner? Christmas gifts?
Beyond the social nature of exchange, there is a connection between a
person and the object that person created. Echoing a Lockean notion of
property, Mauss argues that the entire capitalist structure is at odds with
morality insofar as the system prevents a person from following the travels
of his handiwork and, with a Marxian overtone, sharing in the profits of its
sale. 113 In construing the meaning of a gift, one has to pay attention to the
107. See PeterJ. Richerson & Robert Boyd, Complex Societies: The Evolution of a Crude
Superorganism, 10 HuIAN NATuRE 253, 269 (1999).
108. This is not to claim that capitalism does not advance the wealth of most people.
There is evidence that it does raise all boats. See, e.g., F.A. HAYEK, Tua FATAL CONCEIT
(1988). But even optimistic accounts of capitalism note that there are inequalities in
wealth in the system. See, e.g., LEE A. TAURs, Developmental Responsibility, in MULTINA-
TIONAL MANAGERS AND POVERTY IN THE THIRD WORLD 127-39 (Lee A. Taurs ed., 1982)
(implicitly recognizing corporate responsibilities in the midst of economic inequity).
109. See MAuss,,supra note 104, at 75-77.
110. See id.
111. See MALINOWSKI, supra note 10, at 510.
112. See id. at 176-94.
113. See MAuss, supra note 104, at 96.
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meaning of the self. If one considers multiple dimensions of the self, one
can see its communal sense. Not only could it contemplate a relationship
between the giver and the recipient, but also between the maker and the
object. Distinctions between personal and commercial are much more
ambiguous than what one generally encounters in traditional economic
analysis. Because of that ambiguity, an analysis founded on a self-inter-
ested distinction between personal and commercial must fail if human
beings are indeed social beings. This failure, however, is not necessarily a
bad thing. Although a market assessment based on economic self-interest
may not provide adequate distinction between what is and what is not a
corrupting exchange, seeing its limitations can redirect attention from a
market description to a more complete assessment.
B. The Spiritual Nature of Giving
In addition to the social context in which one makes a gift and in which
nothing is ever simply a personal gift, there is also a sense in which there is
a spiritual connection bound in the exchange. Mauss discusses "potlatch"
with regard to two elements. One is social and the other is spiritual. The
social notion of the potlatch is the honor or prestige conferred by the
wealth, but besides this socially constructed value, there is also the "mana
conferred by wealth; and the absolute obligation to reciprocate these gifts
under pain of losing that mana, that authority-the talisman and source of
wealth that is authority itself."114
The central legal obligation imposed through a gift derives from the
spiritual nature of the exchange. That is, the "thing received is not inac-
tive." 115 Indeed, Mauss argues that "it is clear that in Maori law, the legal
tie, a tie occurring through things, is one between souls, because the thing
itself possesses a soul, is of the soul. '" 1 16 To contemporary ears, this is a
strange concept. One has "ensouled" an object so that when one delivers it
as a gift, one simply does not deliver a useful object (in fact, the object may
not be used at all, as we shall later note), but that the recipient now has
part of the giver's spirit within the object received. This is a dangerous
situation that compels an individual to reciprocate, lest the soul of the giver
be mistreated.117
As one can readily see, gift-giving in this context is a far more sophisti-
cated phenomenon than a monetary transaction. It is one which involves
things of value and which therefore compels reciprocal gift-giving. If done
in a context of a social world inhabited by communal selves as sketched
above, one again finds a series of serious obligations that a private/com-
mercial distinction cannot capture. Nevertheless, it would also be a mis-
take to characterize the actors in such a world as altruistic saints.
In describing the Kula, for instance, Malinowski is careful to note that
114. Id. at 8 (footnotes omitted).
115. Id. at 11-12.
116. Id. at 12.
117. See generally id.
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the people he studied also were acquisitive. l1 8 These were not Roussean
romantic savages who sacrificially loved all with whom they associated and
gave gifts to others without regard for their own reward. They had natural
instincts to get the gift and either (1) not return a gift or (2) return a gift of
significantly less value. So why not return a lesser amount, as an agency
theorist might predict? We see this temptation as even more pronounced
because while reciprocation is necessary, the equivalence of the counter-
gift is the giver's decision without any enforcement or coercion by the
receiver.1 19 However, according to Malinowski, the desire to conform to
social rules overrides natural acquisitiveness. 120 The initial recipient of
the gift is not miserly when he returns the gift.12 '
Trobriandian social thinking provides another reason as to why a per-
son would want to give. It contemplates that a person who owns some-
thing is expected to share it with others, and the higher the rank of that
person, the greater the obligation to do so; the main virtue of the wealthy is
not hoarding, but generosity. 12 2 In fact, it is a demonstration of one's
social status to be generous. 123 Thus, not to give would equate to calling
into question one's right to a high rank.' 2 4
While Mary Douglas aptly characterizes Mauss as arguing that "[a] gift
that does nothing to enhance solidarity is a contradiction," 125 and while
Malinowski is clear that the gifts occurring within the Kula comprise an
economic institution fostering trade, 126 they do so from a framework of
self-interest that is decidedly a communal one rather than an individualis-
tic one. The important point is that an assessment of whether bribery
transactions are personal or commercial within a particular community
may provide a different understanding of human nature than is actually
the case. As Mauss writes:
All these institutions express one fact alone, one social system one pre-
cise state of mind: everything-food, women, children, property, talismans,
land, labour services, priestly functions, and ranks-is there for passing on,
and for balancing accounts. Everything passes to and fro as if there were a
constant exchange of spiritual matter, including things and men, between
clans and individuals, distributed between social ranks, the sexes, and the
generations.1 27
In a social structure in which one's identity is intimately tied to that of
others, reciprocity is not so much "doing for others" as it is "doing for
oneself." Moreover, even the terms associated with transactions may have
an entirely different meanings depending on community. For instance,
118. See MALINOWSKI, supra note 10, at 96.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id. at 95-97.
122. See id. at 97.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. Mary Douglas, Foreward, in MAuss, supra note 104, at vii.
126. See MALINOWSKI, supra note 10, at 84.
127. MAuss, supra note 104, at 14.
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some, but not other, tribes have "one single term to designate buying and
selling, lending and borrowing.'- 28
This analysis results in two implications for anti-bribery statutes.
First, in crafting such laws, the ontological self-description of a society may
make a dramatic difference to both the comprehensibility and the efficacy
of the statute. As such, enforcement of anti-bribery measures may require
significant explanations to be understandable. While it is true that all soci-
eties hate corruption and condemn bribery, what constitutes corruption
may be much more complex than simply trading on a distinction between
what is personal and what is commercial. Second, rather than conclude
the futility of an international statute which transcends cultural barriers, a
broader understanding of this complexity is essential to create a workable
transnational mechanism.
1. Public Nature of the Gift as a Protection
One of the distinguishing features of corrupting bribery is that it is hid-
den.129 That is, one does not proclaim one's prowess in accepting
bribes.130 One takes and provides bribes in secret and outside of the pub-
lic's view. A complication arises when people exchange gifts behind closed
doors, not just because individuals are unable to evaluate them, but
because the shame itself indicates a violation of a norm. The secretive
nature of a gift is further reinforced when the thing given, usually money or
a gift readily convertible into money, is easily transferable and inanimate.
One may be able to suggest two approaches to regulating bribery depend-
ing on the extent to which bribes are public and gifts are freely alienable.
2. Public Nature of the Gift
If generosity is a sign of one's status and power, then one should not be
surprised that gift-giving is not a private affair at all. In fact, Malinowski
found that in traditional societies it was a very public affair with very pre-
cisely-described public rituals. In describing the Kula, Malinowski writes
that:
Along this route, article's [sic] of two kinds, and these two kinds only, are
constantly travelling in opposite directions. In the directions of the hands of
a dock, moves constantly one of these kinds -long necklaces of red shell,
called soulava. In the opposite direction moves the other kind -bracelets of
white shell called mwali. Each of these articles, as it travels in its own direc-
tion on the closed circuit meets on its ways articles of the other class, and is
constantly being exchanged for them. Every movement of the Kula articles,
every detail of the transactions is fixed and regulated by a set of traditional
rules and conventions, and some acts of the Kula are accompanied by an
elaborate magical ritual and public ceremonies. 131
128. Id. at 32 (citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.).
129. See JOHN T. NOONAN, BRIBEs 697 (1984).
130. See generally id.
131. MALINowSM, supra note 10, at 81.
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A gift in this context depends on public recognition of its value. To be
part of and to have a partner in the Kula was not something one wanted to
hide, but rather it was a measure of one's status.' 3 2 Public rituals accom-
panied canoe-building, voyages, exchanges, and feasting.' 33 One contem-
porary step in this direction builds upon the work of Transparency
International: to publicize gifts.13 4
The more gift exchanges are brought into the open, the more they can
be evaluated. While a strictly economic market may not unearth this infor-
mation, a market attuned to such activities may do so more readily. In this
sense, Dunfee's notion of a marketplace of morality135 has its greatest sig-
nificance. For Dunfee, embedded within markets are moral preferences to
which managers should be attentive. 13 6 The question is how these moral
views come to bear on the kind of market in which managers do pay atten-
tion. The answer, we think, is a market that has information about the
nature of the transactions that are taking place. In Trobriand society, the
participants in the hula were sufficiently few to obtain this information.1 37
In a global village, other institutions, such as Transparency International,
must assist in that effort. The pre-market approach of publicizing gifts is a
corrective measure that keeps corruption in check and from which a mar-
ket economy can learn and on which it can build.
3. Alienability
A second characteristic of these gifts is that often they are neither really
used nor subsequently traded, except within the context of the gift-
exchange system.
In the economic and legal systems that have preceded our own, one hardly
ever finds a simple exchange of goods, wealth, and products in transactions
concluded by individuals. [W]hat they exchange is not solely property and
wealth, movable and immovable goods, and things economically useful. In
particular, such exchanges are acts of politeness: banquets, rituals, military
services, women, children, dances, festivals, and fairs, in which economic
transaction is only one element, and in which the passing on of wealth is
only one feature of a much more general and enduring contract. Finally,
these total services and counter-services are committed to in a somewhat
voluntary form by presents and gifts, although in the final analysis they are
strictly compulsory, on pain of private or public warfare. We propose to call
all this the system of total services.138
Moreover, the recipient of the gift does not keep possession of the object for
132. See id. at 81.
133. See id. at 99-104.
134. See supra note 6.
135. See Thomas W. Dunfee, Corporate Governance in a Market with Morality, 62 L. &
COr~NEMP. PROBS. 129 (1999).
136. See id. at 145-49.
137. See MALINOWSKI, supra note 10 at 81. Although we do not report specific popula-
tion figures, Malinowski indicates that a limited number of individuals participate in the
hula.
138. MAuss, supra note 104, at 3-4 (omitting notes).
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any length of time. 139 Following the custom of generosity, when in posses-
sion of the gifts, one is likely to use them not for one's own benefit, but for
that of family and friends. Malinowski notes that a chief with shell strings
would not wear them to a dance, but would instead loan them to relatives
and friends if they wanted them.140
It would be difficult to legislate notions of inalienability and generos-
ity so as to combat bribery. Instead, we suggest that this is a spiritual issue
related to the promotion of generosity. That it may be a matter of the
spirit, however, is not to say that laws cannot do harm to spiritual con-
cerns if legislators are not careful. Although beyond the scope of this arti-
cle, we suggest that as commerce becomes increasingly globalized through
technology, legal regimes ought to avoid encroaching upon spiritual affairs,
particularly those that relate to the ethic of generosity.
4. Peace, Corruption, and Cybernetic Structures
The globalization of commercial activity constitutes one of the driving
forces behind the transnational prohibition of bribery. 141 The movement
to combat bribery, 142 accompanied by the technological forces that allow
it, lead to the characterization of the world as a global village. As Salbu
argues, there is an ethical desirability in this notion because "the normative
framework for the global village is one in which the peoples of the world
recognize the descriptive reality of the term and work together to develop a
unified culture."143 At the same time, Salbu also warns that "the normative
conception of the global village remains an ideal rather than a reality,
because cultural heterogeneity confounds efforts to address world
problems as a single community."1 44
One of the things a global village, a nuclear world, or an efficient free
market needs most is international peace. The destructiveness of nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons is sufficient to warn of the dangers of
contemporary warfare. Free market economist, F. A. Hayek, an author we
have criticized severely in other places, 145 avers that the best way to build
international peace is to encourage trade because it fosters virtues such as
honesty, promise-keeping, and truth-telling; these are more efficient lubri-
cants than coercive threats.146 Hence, there are linkages among trade, eth-
ics, and peace.
In terms of gift-giving and bribery, can one argue that the global
action geared toward the elimination of bribery might foster international
peace? This is not necessarily an easy question. Marcell Mauss, for
139. See MALINOWSKI, supra note 10, at 81.
140. See id. at 87-88.
141. See Nichols, supra note 2.
142. See supra note 7.
143. Salbu, supra note 5, at 229.
144. Id. at 229.
145. See Timothy L. Fort & James J. Noone, Banded Contracts, Mediating Institutions,
and Corporate Governance: A Naturalist Analysis of Contractual Theories of the Firm, 62 L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 169-74 (1999).
146. See HA=c, supra note 108.
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instance, encourages gift-giving and warns of the lack of reciprocity in gift-
giving. Gifts should not be discouraged, he said, but encouraged because
there is an obligation to engage in the giving and receiving, not simply a
reflexive requirement to reciprocate.- 47 "To refuse to give, to fail to invite,
just as to refuse to accept, is tantamount to declaring war; it is to reject the
bond of alliance and commonality."' 48
Does trade promote peace? Citing Robert McGee, Phil Nichols writes
that "[c]ountries that trade with each other are less likely to go to war than
are countries that erect trade barriers to prevent foreign goods from cross-
ing their borders." 149 Nonetheless, anthropologist Lawrence Keeley warns
of a darker side of the relationship between trade and warfare and notes
that the grievances that provoke violence are often economic. 150 Contrary
to the assumption that exchanges of goods and, in this example, marriage
partners keep peace, Keeley argues that
in a brief time frame, this statement is generally true: the exchange of goods
or voluntary intermarriage cannot very well take place while active hostili-
ties are in progress. But in the longer term, assuming that intertribal
exchanges of goods or intermarriage preclude warfare is a mistake. Histori-
cal research has found that disputes between trading partners escalate to
war more frequently that disputes between nations that do not trade much
with each other'15 '
As an example, Keeley points out that Japan traded heavily with the United
States throughout the twentieth' century and that Nazi Germany traded
with the Soviet Union up until its 1939 invasion.152 Kelly argues that the
reason why trading partners and enemies are often the same people is
"csimply propinquity."'1 3 Moreover, the specific cause of warfare in tribal
economies could rest in the failure to receive an expected gift or to refuse a
gift or in one social group's monopoly over a particular commodity.15 4
Thus, the confidence we have in fostering trade as a war-prevention
mechanism is not as straightforward as it might appear. In fact, Keeley
argues that several things are necessary in order to prevent trade from
erupting into warfare. They center on increasing the costs of war and the
benefits of peace 155 so that countries:
treat trading partners with special care since they are our most likely ene-
mies, allow for other countries' to have monopolies on goods we could pro-
duce ourselves and don't attack the monopoly, concentrate on peaceful
rather than military technology and create largest social, economic, and
political units possible ideally encompassing the whole world, rather than
allowing those we do have to fragment into mutually hostile ethnic or tribal
147. See MAuss, supra note 104, at 41-42.
148. Id. at 13.
149. Nichols, supra note 2, at 263.
150. See LAxwvmCE KEELEY, WAR BE'oRE CILIZATION 117 (1996).
151. Id. at 121 (citations omitted).
152. See id. at 122.
153. Id.
154. See id. at 123.
155. See id. at 16-61.
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enclaves.
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Two of these goals, however, require an ethical sensitivity to the legal struc-
tures and cultural sentiments attending to issues such as bribery. For
instance, Salbu seems most concerned with the issue of treating other
countries with the utmost care.1 57 It is because of the linguistic and cul-
tural misunderstandings that can occur between two countries that extra-
territorial laws are problematic.' 58 This is why Salbu writes that as "every
country adjudicates right and wrong in the complex social landscapes of
its neighbors, we may wistfully reminisce about the days when peace was
measured by how well each nation minded its own business." 159 However,
if Nichols is correct that there is no evidence that criminalization of brib-
ery antagonizes host countries,1 60 then we can overcome this significant
hurdle. The dilemma is that, as we have suggested, the process of globally
prohibiting bribery is as important as the substance of the prohibition.
Moreover, complex interdependence makes the cost of going to war
more expensive. If bribery undermines the relationships that create com-
plex interdependence, as Nichols argues, 16 1 then the extent to which cul-
tural misunderstandings occur may be outweighed by avoided violence.
We doubt whether one could ever empirically prove this proposition.' 62 If,
however, bribery makes warfare more expensive and, in fact, does not
antagonize local populations, then extraterritorial and transnational
criminalization of bribery may be prudent.
The second method recommended by Keeley is to create the largest
possible organizations in order to defeat tribalism that leads to warfare.
163
There may be significant truth to this, but increasing institutional size also
gives rise to problems of human nature. Although Nichols uses the term
"fragmentation" in a different way than MacIntyre does, Nichols notes that
"it can be argued that globalization has caused the amount of transnational
bribery to increase and that fragmentation has limited the viability of host
country regulation."164 The anomaly of fragmentation results from the
fact that economic globalization often carries with it a desire to claim an
identity within the global community.' 65
Clearly, what is called for is a notion of federalism. Such a notion
would accord global authority to certain basic rules and principles while
156. Id. at 181.
157. See Salbu, supra note 5.
158. See Salbu, supra note 5.
159. Steven R. Salbu, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat to Global Harmony,
20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 419, 445 (1999).
160. See Philip M. Nichols, Are Extraterritorial Restrictions on Bribery a Viable and
Desirable International Policy Goal Under The Global Conditions of the Late Twentieth Cen-
tury? Increasing Global Security by Controlling Transnational Bribery, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L.
451, 474 (1999).
161. See id. at 463-71.
162. See, e.g., NILS BHINDA ET AL., THE TRUE COST OF CONFLICT: SEVEN RECENT WARS
AND THEIR EFFECTS ON SOCIETY (Michael Cranna ed., 1994).
163. See KEELEY, supra note 150, at 122.
164. Nichols, supra note 2, at 270.
165. See Nichols, supra note 2, at 265.
Vol. 33
2000 Gifts, Bribes, and Exchange
leaving individual countries free to enjoy their own particular culture. The
proposal we offer-to encourage the development of people-sized institu-
tions, to require that any gifts be publicly recognized rather than hidden, to
encourage a spirit of generosity, and to hold possessors of esoteric knowl-
edge to fiduciary duties-would comprise rules that permit such global
span and cultural respect. In particular, this federalism should not be lim-
ited to governmental layering or even focused solely on connections among
government and NGOs. It should also take into account the governance of
corporations and propose a means whereby these economic institutions
can act as self-regulating, cybernetic systems. Dunfee and Hess proceed
along these lines in proposing the C2 Principles.
5. The C2 Principles: A Commentary
In their contribution to this symposium, Dunfee and Hess propose a corpo-
rate commitment to combat bribery in the mode of the Sullivan Principles
adopted by companies confronting apartheid in South Africa.16 6 They call
their proposals the C' Principles. To combat bribery, they advocate that
corporations publicly acknowledge their commitment to the Principles.
Under such Principles, corporations would (a) establish a clear policy
against employees paying bribes and kickbacks, (b) train and discipline
employees, (c) accurately record and report transactions that are indepen-
dently audited, (d) require agents and suppliers to affirm that they have not
engaged in improper payments, (e) establish a monitoring system, (f)
report solicitation for payments to a group such as Transparency Interna-
tional, and (g) protect employees who similarly make such reports. 167
We endorse the C2 Principles. We also note that they will require a
large-scale engagement by many corporations and by many individuals
within each corporation in order for any single endorsing corporation to
effectively discourage bribery. Although it is beneficial for firms to have
active monitoring and disciplining processes; to be effective, the corpora-
tion must also engage its employees in a quest for the good of clean busi-
ness rather than threatening trouble for misbehavior. Thus, to be effective,
corporations must themselves form a community where individuals within
that community see their self-interest connected with that of the corpora-
tions' commitment to merit-based business. Accordingly, it is important to
point out that the discussion regarding the pre-market community sense of
public transactions applies to efforts within the corporation itself. In that
light, we would like to offer a corporate metaphor that has been elaborated
elsewhere, 168 to characterize the nature of corporations that efficaciously
combat bribery.
166. See Hess & Dunfee, supra note 21.
167. See Hess & Dunfee, supra note 21, at 29-30.
168. See Timothy L. Fort, Business as Mediating Institution, 6 Bus. ETHICS Q. 149
(1996); Timothy L. Fort, The Corporation as a Mediating Institution: An Efficacious Syn-
thesis of Stakeholder Theory and Corporate Constituency Statutes, 73 No=E DAME L. REv.
173 (1997); Timothy L. Fort, Goldilocks and Business Ethics: A Paradigm That Fits "Just
Right," 23 J. CoRP. L. 245 (1998) [hereinafter Fort, Goldilocks and Business Ethics]; Fort
& Noone, supra note 145.
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6. Mediating Institutions
In natural law terms, subsidiarity requires that problems ought to be
solved at the smallest appropriate level. Thus, if a problem is a family or
community issue, the family rather than the state should solve it.169 Its
corollary, however, is that it requires a level of participation by individuals
within the community. Thus, John Finnis describes it: "one who is never
more than a cog in big wheels turned by others is denied participation in
one important aspect of human well-being."' 70 A large bureaucratic organ-
ization, governmental or corporate "disguises and conceals and it depends
for its power on its success at disguise and concealment."' 7 ' What does it
conceal? In a bureaucratic system, the system which Noonan notes corre-
lates with the advent of bribery, 172 one assumes that one cannot ultimately
adjudicate among various moral traditions, so one does not ask ultimate
questions. One brackets them, and instead relies upon a process that will
generate choices so individuals can determine autonomously what particu-
lar thing maximizes their individual self-interest. Free-market economics is
based on precisely this conception.' 73 It is based not on determining the
"good" of a product, but on how to efficiently produce a product that meets
market demand. Consumer choice, legal regulation, and competition then
make assessments of what products are acceptable. The manager does not
ask ultimate questions as asking them is beyond the scope of his job as an
agent. For MacIntyre, the power of managerial efficiency depends on the
ability to conceal the fact that deep values are at stake in corporate
affairs. 174 Moreover, as Robert Jackall demonstrates, large bureaucracies
conceal the consequences of one individual's actions. 175 "Who will notice
or care if I take a bribe? No one will find out and if they do, it's not worth
the time to go after me." The larger the organization, the more likely this
becomes a plausible argument to a rational economic actor.
There is a biological reason for why human beings "short-circuit"
when it comes to moral responsibilities in large organizations. Anthropolo-
gists have found consistent group sizes among aboriginal populations.
These tend to cluster between twenty-five and thirty-five (the band) and
four hundred to six hundred (the macro-band), which is the largest com-
munity that interacts regularly. 176 One of the difficulties in larger group-
ings is that scalar stress, that is increasing numbers of disputes within the
group, increases exponentially rather than arithmetically for additions to
169. See RIcHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, DOING WELL AND DOING GOOD: THE CHALLENGE TO
THE CHRISTIAN CAPITALIST 243-45 (1992).
170. See JOHN FINNIs, NATURAL LAw AN NATURAL RIGHTS 147 (1980).
171. MAcINT'YPm, supra note 85, at 103.
172. See generally NOONAN, supra note 129.
173. See generally FRIEDMAN, supra note 51.
174. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
175. See JAcKALL, supra note 56, at 11-12.
176. SeeJoseph Birdsell, On Population Structure in Generalized Hunting and Collecting
Population, 12 EVOLUTION 189, 196-99 (1958).
Vol. 33
2000 Gifts, Bribes, and Exchange
the group beyond these "magic numbers."'177 All of these relatively small
numbers suggest a simple numerical empowerment of individuals. In such
groups, morality may be communal, but the individual's influence on her
relevant community is arithmetically more powerful.1 78
This emphasis on small groups has contemporary validation. In his
study on the development of human language, psychologist Robin Dunbar
accounted for the genesis of its development.' 79 He noted that a typical
explanation for the difference between humans and other animals is the
large size of the human brain. 180 Since whales and elephants have larger
brains than humans, he examined the ratio of the neocortex-that part of
the brain responsible for cognition as opposed to the controller of bodily
functions and movement-to body mass.181 In doing so, he found general
groupings of neocortex ratios; that is, reptiles were in a certain range, fish
in another, primates in yet another. Human brains had, by far, the highest
ratio.182 Dunbar also noticed that primates tend to limit the size of the
group. Beyond a certain number, the group fissions.183 He then plotted a
graph of primate neocortex ratios against group size. 184 Extrapolating
from the results, he predicted that the maximum size of a human group to
be 150.185 This is in the range of the hunter-gatherer numbers we just saw,
but does it have any contemporary ratification? In fact, in looking at other
studies, Dunbar consistently found these numbers in diverse communities
such as the Christian Hutterites in Europe; the Dakotas and southern
Canada; the Mormons led by Brigham Young in the journey to Utah; the
sizes of optimal congregations in a study by the Church of England; and
the size of the military company unit.'8 6 Dunbar relates this to sociologi-
cal studies, which indicate:
that social groupings larger than 150-200 become increasingly hierarchical
in structure. Small social groups tend to lack structure of any kind, relying
instead on personal contacts to oil the wheels of social intercourse. But with
more people to coordinate, hierarchical structures are required. There must
be chiefs to direct, and a police force to ensure that social rules are adhered
to. And this turns out to be an unwritten rule in modern business organiza-
tions too. Businesses with fewer than 150-200 people can be organized on
entirely informal lines, relying on personal contacts between employees to
ensure the proper exchange of information.187
177. Gregory Johnson, Organizational Structure and Scalar Stress, in THEORY AND
EXPLANATION IN ARcHAEOLOGY 389, 396-404 (C. Renfrew et al. eds., 1982).
178. See Fort, Goldilocks and Business Ethics, supra note 168, at 263-64.
179. See generally ROBIN DuNBAR, GROOMING, GossIP, AND THE EVOLUTnON OF LANGUAGE
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180. See id. at 56.
181. See id. at 56-57.
182. See id. at 57-63.
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187. Id. at 71-73.
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These anthropological realities suggest that certain capacities are uni-
versal within human beings. The findings themselves do not suggest uni-
versal norms, but do indicate basic human capacities that may have an
impact on how human beings relate to each other.
Such small institutions have been called "mediating institutions."' 88
They stand between the individual and society.' 8 9 They socialize and
empower the individual and thereby, ideally, make such individuals into
citizens who enter society with the tools to negotiate knowing that they are
social creatures dependent upon a community. 190 That is the rosy view.
The thorny stem is that these groups can be insular, violent, and reclu-
sive. 19 1 The difference between the rose petals and the thorns is the differ-
ence between a mediating institution and a quarantining institution. A
mediating institution provides a community for its members, but it does
mediate, so that it is open to the outside world. It therefore is always nego-
tiating and adapting. On the other hand, a quarantining institution sets off
the community from society. It sets off members of the community to keep
them pure from the diseases of the outside world. Interactions between a
quarantining institution and society tend to be hostile rather than adaptive.
While a mediating institution must have a unique identity, it also contains
within its feedback mechanisms, its cybernetics, 19 2 openness to environ-
mental changes.
We have applied this notion of mediating institutions to organizational
ethical issues.193 The principle remains the same in global organizational
life. The term "global village" is helpful insofar as it demonstrates the com-
plex interdependency of our lives with every other living creature on the
planet. This becomes an increasingly intelligible reality in the e-commerce
age. Recognizing such interdependency is a helpful first step in posing
what duties we have to those other creatures. At the same time, the term is
dangerously misleading because a "village" implies a smallness that one
can cognize and it is difficult to cognize relationships with six billion
human beings, not to mention other living animals, plants, and the earth
generally. Because of this, thinking in terms of us all living in a "village"
poses real risks of underestimating the importance and the structures of
intermediary institutions that, in fact, regularly instill in us the notion of
interconnectedness.
Although mediating institutions may sound nostalgic, the e-commerce
age will rely on them to foster ethical behavior. If we are anywhere close to
being right about the need for communities to foster ethical behavior, then
building the communal structures in the e-commerce age is a necessary
step for business ethics. If individuals are to take ethical responsibilities
seriously then business ethicists, particularly those with either organiza-
188. See BERGER & NEuH-us, supra note 58.
189. See id.
190. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE LJ. 1539 (1988).
191. See id.
192. See RAPPAPORT, supra note 53.
193. See Fort & Noone, supra note 145.
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tional or legal skills, need to attend to how the character of those individu-
als are formed.
It would seem that global business will provide the means for commu-
nication and economic integration of the world, a step that may help miti-
gate some tribal rivalry. Nevertheless, it is not the tribe that causes
warfare, but rather a certain kind of tribalism. In his study of nonviolent
societies, anthropologist David Fabbro notes that the following attributes
are present in peaceful societies: small and open communities with face-to-
face interpersonal interactions; an egalitarian social structure; generalized
reciprocity; social control and decision making through group consensus;
and nonviolent values and enculturation.194
His list is interesting in that the characteristics it encompasses are vir-
tually identical to our description of mediating institutions, at least those
with a normative character. 195 A central task for business ethicists is to
figure out how to create these structures in an age dominated by a technol-
ogy and an economic model that shrinks the world. It is in this combina-
tion of mediating institutions in a global village where business ethics will
find the significance of its work in linking justice and business to sustaina-
ble peace.
In an e-commerce age, information has value. In terms of bribery, we
emphasize that necessary social efficiency may be most efficaciously pro-
vided by truthful information about bribe-taking practices so that mem-
bers of a community, particularly within corporations that adopt the C2
Principles and where bribery exists can assess the propriety of the action.
This disclosure position may be even more important than the distribution
of assets which relies on the importance of individuals to make their own
autonomous choices of what to do with those assets. In some respects, this
is a minor quibble. Both efficient distribution of resources and truthful-
ness about bribe-taking are important. We believe this public disclosure is
a central insight demonstrated anthropologically with consequences for
legal affairs.
Conclusion
We began by asking what is left to be said about bribery. In response, we
offer three arguments that relate more to the institutions and processes that
regulate bribery. First, if we are to encourage individuals to refrain from
bribing and bribe-taking, they must learn to see that their self-interest,
which would otherwise be enhanced by the bribing activity as long as they
are not caught, is connected to the welfare of the community. Such a com-
munal self cannot be asserted rhetorically; transnational organizations,
especially corporations, in designing laws and treaties, should emphasize
194. See Leslie E. Sponsel, The Natural History of Peace: The Positive View of Human
Nature and Its Potential, in A NATURAL HISTORY OF PEACE 95, 106-07 (Thomas Gregor ed.,
1996) (citing David Fabbro, Peaceful Societies: An Introduction, 15 J. PEACE REs., 67-83
(1978)).
195. See supra notes 169-92 and accompanying text.
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the importance of local organizations. Second, anthropology suggests that
communal self-interest, public acknowledgment of the gift, and a spiritual
involvement in the transaction, particularly involving generosity, prevent
gift-giving from becoming corruptive. These communal protections rein-
force the importance of the empowerment of people-sized institutions that
can enculturate these norms.
Finally, gift-giving and mediating institutions can be linked to global
business in a way that fosters peace.196 Economics can initiate relation-
ships necessary for peace building. To do so in a way that promotes and
sustains peace rather than causes divisiveness is to encourage ethical busi-
ness behavior. Ethical business behavior is best fostered when human
beings can meaningfully connect their self-interest with the welfare of
others. Because bribery harms the welfare of others, it should be fought
for deontological, consequential, efficiency, communal, and peace-oriented
reasons. We hope that the considerations raised in this paper will assist in
that effort.
196. In fact, although beyond the scope of this paper, we would like to propose peace
as a telos for global business ethics. See Timothy L. Fort, Corporate Makahiki: The Gov-
erning Telos of Peace, 38 AM. Bus. LJ. (forthcoming 2001).
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